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This paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment to study the role of information in determining 
take-up patterns of social benefits in a non-stigma environment. We find that take-up rate of 
households who have the incentive to search for information for a longer period of time is 
between 8 and 13 percentage points higher as compared to a control group of households. 
This result is robust to the inclusion of various household characteristics. Our finding 
provides strong empirical support for information as an important explanation for low take-up 
rates. 
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Introduction 
 
Low take-up rate occurs across countries as well as programs. Estimates of the extent 
of take-up of social benefits, including our case, range between 40 and 80 percent. In 
a recent survey on the explanations for low take-up of social benefits Currie (2004) 
has concluded that “after many years of research, we still have relatively little insight 
into precisely what types of cost matter most.” The goal of this paper is to use a quasi-
natural experiment to shed light on the importance of information cost as a potential 
explanation for low take-up rate of social benefits.  
 
Information cost as a significant explanation for low take-up rate was first emphasized 
by Coe (1979), who found that the most frequent reason for non-take-up is lack of 
information.
4 However, this result had limited influence in terms of establishing 
strong support for the information explanation mainly because self-reporting is seen 
as evasive.
5 More recently, Daponte et al (1999) used a randomized experiment to 
provide direct evidence on the importance of information. They found that out of 31 
eligible households, 11 households (35 percent) had applied after they were given 
information while 20 households (65 percent) did not apply for food stamps even after 
they were informed of their eligibility.  
 
Throughout the years, and especially since the pioneering work of Moffitt (1983) who 
modeled the decision to take social benefit in a cost-benefit framework, stigma was a 
much more prevalent explanation for low take-up rate. Several works also point to 
administrative cost as an important explanation for low take-up rate. For example, 
Warlick (1982) has shown that residents of small cities, which is a proxy for higher 
administrative cost, exhibit lower take-up rates.
6 McGarry (1996) found that take-up 
rates tend to fall as the level of schooling increases. That result was interpreted as 
                                                 
4 In a subsequent paper Coe (1983) found similar results where the majority of eligible households that 
do not use food stamps report lack of information as the reason for non-take-up. 
5 In a more detailed questionnaire, people were influenced by stigma even though they cited lack of 
information as a reason for non-take-up (Currie, 2004).  
6  Administrative cost appears to be an important factor in Dorsett et al (1991), Konig and Ridder 
(1997) and Bitler et al (2003). In fact, Daponte et al (1999) could be also seen as evidence for the 
importance of administrative cost. Half of those households that did not apply were eligible for modest 
monthly benefits ($10 or less).   3
evidence for the relatively small role of information cost compared to administrative 
cost.  
 
The search for explanations encounters two main difficulties in examining the relative 
importance of information. First, the extensive literature on the reasons for low take-
up rate of social benefits is based mainly on means-tested social programs. Because 
the potential effect of stigma on take-up is very evident in those programs, it is 
difficult to isolate the effect of the other two factors: information and administrative 
cost.  
 
Second, it is difficult to estimate the role of information based on a general purpose 
survey or administrative database. The attempt to employ household characteristics to 
estimate the significance of information as a reason for low take-up rate is 
questionable. Each attribute tends to influence more than one factor at the same time. 
For example, education is commonly used to explain variation in take-up rates, but it 
simultaneously affects stigma, information and administrative cost. High education 
levels tend to lower the cost of information but at the same time might be associated 
with higher social and psychological cost (stigma). In addition, higher education may 
increase (foregone wage) or decrease the cost of administration (lower cost of filling 
out forms). 
 
The positive correlation between the level of benefits and take-up rates, which is one 
of the most solid empirical findings in the literature, could not be used as supporting 
evidence for either the importance of information/administration or for stigma
7. The 
cost structure of these three factors may consist of a fixed cost component. Thus, the 
positive correlation could be in line with all three explanations. 
 
The unique data set on water consumption bills in Israel provides a quasi-natural 
experiment to study to the role of information cost in determining take-up patterns of 
social benefits. The water pricing structure in Israel consists of three increasing blocks 
tariffs (IBT). In 2002, the lowest price applies to the first 96 cubic meters on a yearly 
basis (first block), additional consumption up to 84 cubic meters is subject to an 
                                                 
7 For example, Blank and Card (1991) found that higher benefit replacement rates correlated with 
higher take-up rates. For a comprehensive review see Currie (2004) and Hernanz et al. (2004).   4
intermediate price (second block), and any extra consumption is charged at the 
highest price (third block). This pricing structure has an additional feature. 
Households larger than four persons are entitled to an additional 36 cubic meters per 
person per year at a low rate. 
 
The monetary value of that additional quantity of water could be up to 8 percent of 
annual water expenditures in each year for the next 18 years (approximately). This 
social benefit is non-automatic and a household must complete a very simple form 
(half a page) to take-up that social benefit. Every household, regardless of its income 
or wealth, is entitled to this social benefit (i.e., it is not means-tested). The social 
benefit here should not be associated with stigma because of the following two 
features: it is both universal and not intended to replace foregone income.  
 
We follow the take-up patterns for three years of two groups of households following 
a household expansion by one member. The first group consists of five-member 
households that had expanded to six members for which the information on social 
benefits have already been relevant prior to the current household expansion. This 
group of households had the monetary incentive to search for information regarding 
the program before the current household expansion and is used here as our treated 
group. The second group, which serves as a control group, is composed of households 
of four members that expand to five members. The information for the second group 
was immaterial in the past and became relevant with the household’s current 
expansion. 
 
This information gap is used to test whether households who were potentially exposed 
to information for a longer period of time react differently in terms of taking-up their 
social benefits as compared to a control group of households when a household of 
either type expands by one member. Both groups of households face the same (direct) 
administrative cost. In addition, all households are entitled to the same social benefits 
as a result of the current household expansion. The stigma cost in our context does not 
play an important role, if any. 
 
In the next section we sketch a very simple model of take-up. In section 3 we describe 
the structure of social benefits in water consumption and the benefit calculation.   5
Section 4 describes the definition of take-up and Section 5 presents the data. Section 6 
presents the estimation methodology, results and robustness analysis. Section 7 
includes the time of exposure results and section 8 concludes. 
 
2. A simple model of take-up 
 
H e r e  w e  s k e t c h  a  v e r y  s i m p l e  m o d e l  to guide our discussion on the role of 
information in shaping take-up of social benefits. Suppose a household derives utility 
from monetary income only: 
 
(1) ), Y ( U U1 =  
 
where U1 is the utility level in absence of welfare benefits, Y is income from all 
sources and U follows the standard assumptions (monotonic and quasi-concave). If a 
household participates in a welfare program then the utility, U2 is: 
 
(2) ), B Y ( U U2 φ − + =  
 
where B represents the level of social benefits and φ stands for participation costs. 
This formulation assumes that the costs of collecting welfare benefits are monetary 
costs only, which is more likely in our context of low stigma cost.  
 
The costs of participation in a welfare program may have both a fixed component and 
a variable component that varies with the benefits level: 
 
(3) ) B ( 1 0 φ + φ = φ , 
 
A household will decide to participate in the program as long as benefits are greater 
than costs regardless of the level of income. That result is particular to the way the 
costs affect utility. A household is likely to participate the greater the benefits level is 
in case where  0 φ >0 and  1 φ =0, which is the most simple case. The way we model the 
role of information here is by assuming that the cost of participation is a negative   6
function of potential exposure time to the program,  0 φ = 0 φ (t) where t reflects the time 
since the entitlement to social benefits. Thus, the decision to participate in a program 
is positively affected by exposure time. 
 
3. Social benefit in water consumption 
 
The social benefit that is the focus of this paper is provided to all households in Israel 
in terms of reduced price for one of the most basic goods – water. In this regard it is 
close to in-kind transfer and is similar in nature to food stamps. The pricing structure 
of water in Israel consists of three increasing block tariffs (IBT).
8 This structure 
accounts for both efficiency and equity considerations: the highest marginal price 
reflects efficiency, where it roughly covers the marginal cost, whereas the low price 




In 2002, the price in the first block, applying to the first 96 cubic meters (hereinafter: 
m
3), was $1.2/m
3 including a sewage surcharge. The price in the second block, for 
additional consumption up to 84 cubic meters, was $1.5/m




This pricing structure has an additional feature. Households larger than four persons 
are entitled to an additional 36m
3 per person per year at a low rate.
10 This particular 
feature has been an integral part of IBT structure for more than 30 years, and is both 
universal and non-automatic. To receive this social benefit a household must report on 
household size. Poor families tend to be large, and this feature maintains that 
consideration in IBT pricing structure. 
 
The social benefit in water consumption is associated with an extremely low 
administrative cost. To obtain the supplementary quantity of water at a low price, a 
                                                 
8 Israel was one of the pioneers in using IBT Pricing structure. In the past twenty years there has been a 
global trend toward the use of IBT (OECD 1999). 
9Note that IBT may not be an optimal pricing structure even after taking equity consideration into 
account (Bös, 1994). 
10     Households with irrigated lawns are allowed an additional 0.6m
3 per square meter per year, up to 
300m
3, at a low price (excluding sewage surcharge).   7
household must fill out a very simple form: half a page requesting only the names and 
ID numbers of all household members, and the attached birth certificate of the 
newborn household member (see Appendix 1). A family automatically receives a 
birth certificate immediately after a baby is born. The form may be sent by regular 
mail (cost of a stamp) or via fax (cost of a phone call). Nevertheless, households may 
incur additional indirect administrative costs. 
 
A household must report to the water utility provider every time a new member joins 
the household in order to get the supplementary quantity of water at a low price. This 
benefit may continue for years until a member leaves the household. According to the 
law, the benefit starts on the reporting date onward (no retroactive incidence). The 
social benefit takes effect right after reporting (i.e., the next billing period). There is 
no uncertainty regarding the outcome of the application process and in practice no 
rejections occurs.      
 
Reporting the number of household members does not require sharing information 
regarding the household’s economic conditions such as income, wealth or working 
status with the water utility officials – information that may be associated with 
psychological or social cost as in the case of income maintenance or unemployment 
benefits. This additional quantity is given to every household regardless of income. 
Thus, the universality of that social benefit reduces substantially, if not eliminates, the 
role of stigma in determining take-up rates. 
 
3.1 Benefit calculation 
We define social benefit in this paper as the difference between the current (virtual) 
water bill in the case of reporting on household size and virtual (current) water bill in 
the case of non-reporting. Unlike food stamps, the social benefit here depends on the 
level of (water) consumption. For example, the social benefit could even be zero if 
water consumption is low enough (equation 1). 
 
As can be seen in equation (1), the calculated benefit depends non-linearly on the 
level of water consumption. This equation applies for a household larger than four 
persons without a garden.  
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Where SB denotes the yearly social benefit, C denotes the actual water consumption, 
N denotes the true number of persons above four and Pi denotes the marginal price of 
water at block i. X is defined as the difference between the actual water consumption 
and 36 multiply by N. Recall that every household is entitled to 96m
3 of water at a 
low rate and an additional 84m
3 at an intermediate rate. 
 
The maximum yearly social benefit for an additional household member equals the 
difference between the highest and lowest price multiplied by the supplementary 
quantity (Figure 1). The maximum present value of social benefit per person is 
approximately $315. To obtain the maximum present value of social benefits for a 
household, that amount should be multiplied by the number of household members 
above four, for each year. 
Figure 1: Yearly social benefit for a 5-member household 
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4. The definition of take-up 
 
There are two alternative ways to define take-up in this paper. One way is to define 
take-up based on the reporting status of households. An alternative definition of take-
up could be based on the presence of a positive social benefit in addition to reporting 
status. We employ only the first definition for reasons that are discussed below. 
 
According to the first definition, the eligible population is divided into participants 
and non-participants. Participants are those households that have reported to 
“Hagihon” the same number of individuals as appears in the official files in the 
Ministry of the Interior. We assume here that the size of a household in the official 
files is also the actual size. These data files are used by the Israeli government for 
many purposes such as determining child allowance eligibility, elections, and drafting 
the relevant population into the army. Our database does not contain the household 
age structure and reporting date. Therefore, we do not know the length of 
participation. 
 
The definition of take-up that we use, which is based on the household’s reporting 
status, may include households that have ex-post zero social benefit due to a low level 
of water consumption in the current year and seemingly have no incentive to report. 
The weakness of using the first definition is quantitatively limited. Most households 
in our working data set are not in the lowest price category. More than 90 percent of 
five-member households is either at the intermediate or highest marginal price level. 
  
Alternatively, we could have defined take-up in the following way: a reporting 
household that is also entitled to a positive social benefit is defined as a participant. 
Those households that are entitled to a positive social benefit and yet do not report 
would have been defined as non-participants. 
 
However, a rational household should decide to report based on the expected present 
value of social benefits that could be different from the ex-post calculation of social 
benefit in the current year. Recall that the calculated social benefit depends on actual 
water consumption, which is uncertain. The alternative definition would overlook   10
households who had positive benefits in the past (and may have in the future) but 
have zero benefits at the current year. 
 
A definition that is based on the calculated social benefit may be exposed to 
endogeneity. The dependent variable in this case – entitlement to a positive social 
benefit – is influenced by the household level of water consumption. Actual water 
consumption is clearly an endogenous variable and is associated with household 
characteristics. For example, poor households tend to have disproportional zero social 
benefits because of low level of water consumption while rich households more likely 
have a positive social benefit due to their high consumption level (Figure 2). 
Therefore, using take-up as a dependent variable based on this definition would 
introduce an endogeneity problem when household wealth indicators are used as 
explanatory variables. 
 
The alternative definition may be exposed to an additional source of endogeneity. The 
endogeneity results from the negative relationship between reporting status and water 
price. Those households who do not report on their size face higher price compared to 
households who do report, holding everything else constant. The actual level of water 
consumption of participants may be higher. The calculated benefits for participants 
are biased to the extent that the elasticity of water consumption is negative (Dahan 
and Nisan, 2005). Thus, it generates a spurious positive correlation between the level 
of social benefits and the likelihood of reporting. 
 
5. Data 
The original data set we have covers all households in Jerusalem for the years 1999-
2002.
11 Our data set comes from three main sources: “Hagihon,” the only water utility 
in Jerusalem; the Municipality of Jerusalem; and the Israel Ministry of the Interior. 
Most of the data originate with the Municipality of Jerusalem and were merged with 
household water consumption data from “Hagihon” and household size at the end of 
each year from the Ministry of the Interior. 
                                                 
11 We excluded observations for several reasons (commercial consumers, shared meters consumers, 
households larger than twelve individuals, households metered during part of the year and 
identification mismatch at different sources).   11
 
In the merged data set we have information on household size from two different 
sources: household size as reported to “Hagihon” and household size as documented 
in the Ministry of the Interior. This allows us to identify those households that are 
entitled to the social benefit but do not collect it. Thus, the use of these two data 
sources enables us to define eligibility and take-up in a relatively precise way. 
 
As discussed previously, the eligible population is composed of households larger 
than four persons. The main focus is to analyze take-up rate patterns following a 
family expansion by one member of those households that are four persons or larger.
12 
As a result, all households of four persons or less were excluded.   
 
Our main working population consists of households that had expanded between 1999 
and 2002 according to the official files (i.e., the Ministry of Interior). We constructed 
three different pools (A, B and C) that differ in time distance between the date of 
household expansion and the timing we examine the reporting status.  
 
The first pool is composed of three panels – 1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 – 
where in the first pool we have information on the same household for two 
consecutive years.
13 This allows us to identify those households that had expanded 
during the second year and their reporting status at the end of the same year, a half 
year after the expansion on average. For the sake of conciseness, throughout the paper 
we use one year, two years and three years instead of a half year, a year and a half and 
two years and half, respectively.  
 
The second pool includes two panels – 1999-2001 and 2000-2002. We follow the 
same household for three consecutive years. This covers those households that had 
expanded during the second year together with their reporting status at the end of the 
third year, a year and half after the expansion on average. The third pool, which is in 
fact a panel, is composed of households with information for four consecutive years 
(1999-2002). This covers those households that had expanded during the second year 
                                                 
12 Dahan and Nisan (2006b) examine the take-up patterns of those who had expanded by two members. 
13 The data available to us consists of households who stay in the same apartment for the entire period 
in each panel.   12
together with their reporting status at the end of the fourth year, two years and half 
after the expansion on average. In both pools B and C those households that were 
expanded more than once were excluded because those households are entitled to 
double (or even triple) social benefits.  
 
Table 1: Data by household type 
Type of household  Pool 
Total  Did  not 
expand 
and other* 






5 that became 6 
and reported on 
the fifth member 
5 that became 6 but 
did not report on 
the fifth member 
Pool A (1 year)  89,168  84,292  2,656 2,220 1,381   839  
1999-2000 28,085  26,473     853  759 514  245 
2000-2001 29,828  28,240     893  695 427  268 
2001-2002 31,255  29,579     910  766 440  326 
Pool B (2 years)  54,411  51,854  1,377 1,180 772   408  
1999-2001 26,305  25,017     678  610 420  190 
2000-2002 28,106  26,837     699  570 352  218 
Pool C (3 years) 
(1999-2002) 
24,992 23,062     421  377 263  114 
* Other includes expanded households of 6 or more and households that expanded by more than one 
member and households with an official size that is different compared to “Hagihon” (except for 
households of five members that are listed in “Hagihon” as four). 
 
 
In all three pools, we focus on two household groups. In pool A the first group 
(hereinafter: the treated group) covers 2,220 households of five members that become 
six (Table 1). The second group of pool A consists of 2,656 four-member households 
that expanded by one member. These households are our control group.  
 
The benefits level can be up to 8 percent of annual water expenditures but for most 
households it is around 5-6 percent (Figure 2). Table 2 presents take-up rates using 
the definition outlined above. The take-up rate among households of five members 
that become six is around 52 percent two years after the expansion which is well 
within the range of take-up rates in social programs in OECD countries (Hernanz et 
al, 2004).  
   13
The take-up rate of five-member-households (that become six) is higher compared to 
the take-up rate among households of four members that become five (41 percent). 
The differences are similar regardless of the pool we use.  
 
Time distance matters as is evident in Table 2. The take-up rate after two years is 
almost twice as much as the rate after one year. Clearly, it takes time to collect the 
social benefit associated with reporting. The take-up after three years is just slightly 
higher compared to two years. For example, the take-up rate among households of 
five members that become six is 28 percent after one year, 52 percent after two years 
and 55 percent three years after the expansion. Notice that these take-up rates are 
different from the take-up rates of the same household for various time distances, as 
shown in Table 7. We will return to this issue later. 
 
Table 2: Take-up rates for different time distances 
Take-up rates  Pool 




5 that become 
6 (all)  
Treated 
Group 
5 that become 
6 and reported 
on the fifth 
member 
5 that become 
6 but did not 
report on the 
fifth member 
Pool A (1 year)  0.20  0.28  0.36  0.13 
1999-2000  0.21 0.31 0.39 0.15 
2000-2001  0.22 0.29 0.37 0.15 
2001-2002  0.18 0.23 0.33 0.11 
Pool  B  (2  years)  0.41 0.52 0.63 0.32 
1999-2001  0.42 0.53 0.64 0.29 
2000-2002  0.41 0.51 0.61 0.34 
Pool C (3 years) 
(1999-2002) 
0.45 0.55 0.64 0.35 
 
 6. Estimation 
 
6.1 Methodology 
In order to examine the role of information we distinguish between two separate 
groups of households. These two groups are identical in the following sense: they   14
both expanded by one member at the beginning of the respective period. The first 
group consists of five members who had expanded to six and for which the 
information regarding social benefits is valuable prior to the current household 
expansion. Those households had the monetary incentive to search for that 
information. 
 
The second type is a four-member household that expanded to five members. Those 
households did not have the incentive to report according to the rules of the program. 
It should be recalled that the price structure of water is the same for every household 
up to four members regardless of household size. Therefore, there is no social benefit 
associated with additional members as long as the household is four members or less.  
 
The first type of households had the incentive to search for information regarding the 
social benefits associated with reporting before the current household expansion, 
while for the second type the information was immaterial in the past and became 
relevant with the current expansion of the household.
14 We use the information gap 
between these two groups and the current expansion of a household by one member as 
a quasi-natural experiment. 
 
The treated group is composed of two sub-groups of households: households of five 
members who expanded to six and had reported in the past on the fifth member and 
households of five members who expanded to six but had not reported on the fifth 
member. Those households that had reported on the fifth member apparently were in 
possession of the information on social benefits in water consumption before the 
current household expansion. 
 
Those households are presumably informed but we cannot rule out that this group 
may be a selection of households that had faced lower administrative cost in the 
previous household expansion. Likewise the behavior of households that did not 
report on the fifth member may be consistent with two conflicting hypotheses: those 
households were truly uninformed and consequently they had not collected their 
                                                 
14 A rational household may have the incentive to search for information even before becoming eligible 
(i.e., before the anticipated fifth member joins the household) but it is true for both the treated and 
control groups.   15
social benefits following the previous household expansion or they were fully 
informed but decided not to report because of cost-benefit considerations. 
 
Thus, using households that had reported on the fifth member as an alternative treated 
group may be exposed to a self-selection problem. The risk of self-selection problem 
is important to extent that the cost-benefits considerations that dictate the decision to 
report in the past on the fifth member is correlated with the conditions following the 
current household expansion.  We use instead all five-member households who 
became six as our treated group. 
 
Our main goal is to test whether the treated group reacts differently in terms of taking-
up their social benefits compared to the control group, when a household of either 
type is expanded by one member. Based on the model sketched in Section 2 we 
hypothesize that those households which for a longer period of time had the incentive 
to collect information would tend to have higher take-up rates 
 
The treated and control households all face the same administrative process to report 
on household expansion. Thus, the direct administrative cost is the same for all 
households. This direct cost is relatively low: a household needs to complete a half-
page form and send it via mail or fax to the water utility. Yet, households may face 
additional indirect administrative costs. 
 
A potential additional factor that may affect a household’s decision to collect social 
benefits is stigma cost. In our context, stigma cost should not play an important role 
due to the universal nature of this social benefit. Every household, regardless of its 
income or wealth, is entitled to this social benefit (i.e., it is not means-tested).  
 
A household above four members is entitled to an additional 36m
3 of water at a low 
rate for each additional member regardless of its size. Therefore, the treated and 
control groups are entitled to the same social benefits (for a given price) as a result of 
the current expansion.  
 
However, a five-member household that did not report on the fifth member is entitled 
to exactly double quantity of water at a low rate compared to the control group.   16
Seemingly, the coefficient might be overestimated because part of the treated group is 
entitled to higher social benefits. The actual bias should not be quantitatively 
important because the take-up rates of those households are even lower than the 
control group (Table 2). 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics - a comparison of treated and control groups
* 
        The share of households 










B or C 
Obs  1,668  2,220 2,220 2,220 2,220 
Mean  76.8  0.49 0.08 0.02 0.95 
5 turn 6  
Std 23.7  0.5  0.27  0.14  0.22 
Obs  1,894  2,656 2,656 2,656 2,656 
Mean  73.2  0.36 0.06 0.01 0.97 
4 turn 5 
Std  21.6  0.48 0.23 0.12 0.18 
 Means' 




 T  statistic  4.65 9.23  2.79  1.27  -3.03 
Obs  938  1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 
Mean  78.1  0.48 0.08 0.02 0.95 
5 turn 6  
Std 23.7  0.5  0.27  0.13  0.22 
Obs  1,083  1,377 1,377 1,377 1,377 
Mean  74.6  0.35  0.06 0.014 0.96 
4 turn 5 
Std  22.7  0.48 0.23 0.12 0.19 
 Means' 





 T  statistic  3.38 6.44  2.52  0.81 1.71 
Obs  308  377 377 377 377 
Mean  81.89 0.31 0.11 0.03 0.95 
5 turn 6  
Std  25.18 0.46 0.32 0.16 0.21 
Obs  350  421 421 421 421 
Mean  77.14 0.21 0.08 0.02 0.97 
4 turn 5 
Std  23.84 0.41 0.27 0.15 0.17 
 Means' 





 T  statistic  2.48 3.26 1.7 0.25  -1.43 
*The data in this table refer to the year before household expansion. 
 
By its construction, the treated group is larger by one member than the control group, 
and that may generate differences in household characteristics. Table 3 presents 
household characteristics for both groups. It shows that the treated group has larger 
apartment size but it is smaller in terms of apartment size per capita. It is unclear 
which group is wealthier and it depends on the assumed economics of scale in 
housing. The share of Orthodox Jews is higher (statistically significant) among the 
treated group because they tend to have more children. For the other three   17
characteristics: Arab population, below poverty line indicator and price level, the 




6.2 The estimated models 
We estimate two alternative models: the first model does not control for any 
household characteristics while the other model addresses a potential effect of the 
differences in household characteristics and a year effect.  
 
First model: 
(2)   i i i bD a y ε + + = , 
 
and second model: 
(3)  i j j i i i t D y ε + δ + γ + β + α = x  , 
 
where, yi is a dummy variable that is equal to one for a household that had reported 
and zero otherwise. xi denotes a vector of household characteristics in the respective 
period and Di represents the dummy variable for the treatment effect. Di is a binary 
variable that equals 1 for a treated household and zero for a control household. We 
also control for a year effect, tj where there are two separate year effects in the case of 
three panels, one year effect in the case of two panels and no year effect in the case of 
three years panel. 
 
The vector x includes an array of household characteristics that may affect reporting 
behavior. There are three types of variables: wealth indicators (apartment size, garden 
size and poverty indicator), social network indicators (Orthodox Jews and Arabs), 
language barrier (Arabs) and the virtual marginal price of water faced by a household 
which represents the level of social benefits. 
 
The net effect of wealth on take-up is uncertain. According to Moffitt (1983), take-up 
rates should be falling as wealth rises due to lower marginal utility. In contrast, take-
up rates might not be affected directly by wealth level as long as the cost of   18
participation is modeled the way presented in Section 2. In addition, wealth may 
affect take-up rates indirectly (through the connection between education and wealth) 
because we do not control for education in our regressions. A wealthier household 
may incur lower cost of collecting and processing information given the positive 
relations between wealth and education. 
 
According to the recent literature, we hypothesize that a household that belongs to a 
social network is more likely to be informed and as a result would have higher 
probability of reporting (Bertrand et al, 2000).
15 In Jerusalem there are two large 
distinct ethnic groups that may be classified as social networks: Orthodox Jews and 
Arabs. An Orthodox Jewish household is defined as such if it is located in an 
Orthodox neighborhood as classified in the Jerusalem master plan. Similarly, a 
household is defined as Arab if it lives in an Arab neighborhood as classified in the 
Jerusalem master plan. Each one of these two groups maintains close personal 
relations internally and has little social connection with the rest of the population. In 
fact, the Arab population has almost no social connection with the Jewish population.  
 
In addition, an Arab household may face a language barrier. Although the criteria for 
an additional quantity of water at a low rate are outlined both in Hebrew and Arabic 
on the back page of every water bill (though the font size is extremely small), the 
application form is available in Hebrew only. Part of the Arab population in East 
Jerusalem who affiliate themselves with the Palestinian Authority tend to minimize 
the frequency of contact with Israeli official authorities. Therefore, they may be less 
exposed to information regarding their entitlement to social benefits. The Arab 
population may face lower information cost due to the social network but at the same 
time incurs higher information cost due to language barrier. Thus, the net effect must 
be examined empirically. 
 
As noted before, both the treated and control groups are entitled to the same 
additional quantity of water at a low rate following the current expansion by one 
member. Yet, the actual level of social benefits may still differ depending on the 
                                                 
15  See also Aizer and Currie (2004), Duflo and Saez (2003), and Borjas and Hilton (1996).   19
actual level of water consumption that determines the marginal price paid by a 
household.  
 
We use the virtual marginal price as a proxy to estimate the effect of the level of 
social benefits on take-up rates. A marginal virtual price is defined as the marginal 
price that would have been faced by a household given its actual water consumption 
in the event of no reporting on household size. 
 
In general, households that reported on the current expansion face a lower (actual) 
marginal price as compared to households that did not report. This may affect their 
actual water consumption to the extent that price elasticity of water demand is 
negative. The virtual price might be higher for a reporting household and as a result 
the coefficient might be biased downward. The estimated price elasticity of water 
demand is relatively low which subdues that bias (Dahan and Nisan, 2005). 
 
6.3 Results 
We run an OLS regression with and without control variables for household 
characteristics. The outcomes of interest in our case are limited dependent variables. 
However, as noted in Angrist (2001), the problem of causal inference for these 
variables is not fundamentally different from continuous outcomes. If there are no 
covariates or the covariates are sparse and discrete, linear models are no less 
appropriate than other types of dependent variables. The OLS coefficients of dummy 
variables are easy to interpret: the units are percentage points of take-up rates.
16  
 
To estimate the role of information as captured by our treatment dummy variable we 
use three different pools, according to the time gap between the year of household 
expansion and the date the reporting on that expansion is checked. In the first pool the 
dependent variable is defined based on the reporting status of a household a year after 
the expansion. The second and third pools are based on reporting status two and three 
years after the household expansion, respectively.  
 
                                                 
16 Table 5 in the appendix presents Logit regressions and the general picture is the same.    20
Table 4 reports the coefficients and t statistics for the two estimated models. In a 
regression without any control variable, the coefficient of the treated group is around 
7 percentage points even when the reporting status is detected at the end of the 
expansion year. The magnitude of the treatment effect is higher when the reporting 
status is checked at the end of the second or third year since the household expansion. 
The estimated treatment effect ranges between 8 to 10 percentage points. Those 
households for which the information was relevant for a longer period of time indeed 
have higher take-up rate. 
 
We saw earlier that the treated and control groups are not completely identical in their 
characteristics. The second estimated model appearing in Table 4 shows that the 
effect of treatment is only slightly lower, even after controlling for various 
explanatory variables and a year effect. The magnitude of the treatment effect is 
closer to the first estimated model when reporting status is examined at the end of the 
second or third year since the household expansion.  
 
Given the nature of the pool, we control for a year effect in the second estimated 
model. In the one-year pool (which is composed of three panels of two years) we 
found that the 2001-2002 dummy is negative and significant while the other dummy 
is insignificant. The year effect is not significant in the two-year pool and by 
construction there is no year effect in the three-year pool. 
 
 
As discussed above, the Arab household dummy variable reflects two conflicting 
forces in terms of information cost. The negative sign of this coefficient and its 
magnitude is consistent with the hypothesis that language barrier has much more 
influence than social network. The Arab coefficient is -0.12 when reporting status is 
detected at the end of the household expansion year. This coefficient is twice as large 
when reporting status is checked at the end of the second or third year since 
household expansion.  
 
The Orthodox Jewish dummy variable represents a lower information cost due to 
better social network. As expected, the coefficient is positive but it is statistically 
significant in two of the three cases.     21
 
As expected, the level of social benefits positively affects take-up rates as implied by 
the virtual price coefficient. A higher virtual price implies higher social benefits that 
induce a household to collect information and report on household size. In general, 
the coefficient of virtual price B (the intermediate price) is significantly positive 
compared to the lowest price, and it is lower than the coefficient of virtual price C 
(the highest price), although this is not always the case. This result is in line with one 
of the most robust findings in the literature on the reasons for low take-up rates. 
 
In general, all wealth indicators (apartment size by quintiles, garden size and poverty 
indicator
17) are insignificant. This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction 
of the model presented in Section 2. However it can be also in line with the notion 
that take-up rates are influenced by wealth level due to lower marginal utility (Moffitt, 
1983) but it is canceled out by the effect of lower information cost associated with 
higher level wealth, to the extent that wealth and education are correlated. 
 
Table 6 presents a robustness test where we exclude the two ethnic groups from the 
pools. As can be seen, the treatment effect of a potentially informed household is now 
even larger. The take-up rate of households of five who had expanded to six is 13 
percentage points higher when reporting status is checked at the end of the second or 
third year since household expansion. This estimated effect is not sensitive to the 
inclusion of control variables. 
 
The coefficients estimated in both models imply a quantitatively large effect. The 
estimated take-up rate of the treated group is around 25 percent higher as compared to 
the control group. This supports the idea that information plays a major role in 
shaping take-up rates. 
 
7. Time of exposure 
In this section we indirectly explore the role of information. Previously, we used 
reporting status after one year, two years and three years for all households. In 
                                                 
17 In this paper, a household is considered below the poverty line if it is entitled to a municipal tax 
deduction. This tax deduction is means-tested and is indirectly related to the formal poverty line in 
Israel.   22
contrast, here we exploit the panel nature of our data to follow reporting status for the 
same household over time.  
 
Reporting status after three years should not be different from that after two years or 
after one year, unless there has been a change in the cost or benefits of applying for 
social benefits. The actual benefits can be changed as a result of changes in water 
consumption patterns (which in itself may change as a result of the household’s 
economic conditions). The way we capture changes in benefits is by controlling for 
the virtual price. 
 
As explained earlier, stigma cost should not play a role in our case. Thus, changes in 
take-up rates could be the result of changes in information and administrative costs. 
This test is based on households who stay in the same apartment for the entire period. 
Thus, we in fact control for the distance from the applications center, which is a 
natural proxy for administrative cost (Warlick, 1982). The direct administrative cost is 
the same regardless of the application timing. Yet, the administrative cost may still 
change as a result of changes in variables that are not observable. 
 
The fourth possible explanation for changes in take-up rates of the same household 
over time is information. Since information regarding social benefits is continuously 
floating around, the time of exposure since household expansion may play a role. To 
estimate the information effect we run OLS regressions with fixed effects for 
households and time effects. In addition we control for the virtual price.  
 
Interestingly, the quantitative effect of information using this exercise is similar to 
some of the results found in the previous Section. Column 1 in Table 8 shows that the 
take-up rate is 8 percentage points higher after three years compared to the take-up 
rate after two years. That result is not sensitive to the inclusion of an interaction 
variable between time and treatment effects (column 2 in Table 8). As expected, the 
take-up rate in the first year, which is also the expansion year, is much smaller in 
comparison to that after two years. The coefficient of the first year is artificially large 
due to the fact that those households who had expanded near the end of the first year 
collect their social benefits only during the second year.  
   23
We interpret the magnitude of the time coefficient as another strong indication of the 
importance of information in determining take-up patterns. We cannot completely 
rule out an upward bias of this coefficient due to the potential omission of 
administrative factors. However, it is unlikely to relate the time trend in take-up rates 
we found to changes in the administrative cost. 
 
To conclude, we show the importance of the length of exposure to relevant 
information, which complements the evidence we have in Section 6 on the importance 
of information in determining take-up patterns.  
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper addresses two challenges faced in the previous literature. First, the two 
reliable sources on eligibility and take-up allow us to estimate the role of information 
based on a precise definition of take-up. Second, the negligible role of stigma cost in 
our context further helps to isolate the effect of information. This paper provides 
estimates on the importance of information in determining take-up patterns of social 
benefits using a quasi-natural experiment strategy. 
 
We show that the take-up rate of the treated households is substantially higher 
compared to a control group of households. The estimated information effect in terms 
of take-up rates is in the range of 8 and 13 percentage points. This result is robust for 
different time distances and the inclusion of various household characteristics. In 
addition, we found that variables that are directly associated with information cost 
such as social network indicators (Orthodox Jews and Arabs) and language barrier 
(Arabs) have significant influence on take-up rates. 
 
We also employ the panel nature of our dataset to examine the take-up rates of the 
same household over time following the eligibility for social benefits. We found that 
the take-up rate three years after eligibility is 8 percentage points higher as compared 
to two years after entitlement and 30 percentage points higher relative to the end of 
the entitlement year.   
   24
Low take-up rate should be a cause of concern for policy makers because it 
undermines the policy goal. A natural policy implication of our findings is that 
lowering of information barriers is likely to have a significant effect on take-up of 
social benefits, especially for certain population groups.    25
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Table 4: OLS estimates of information effect on take-up rates 
(The dependent variable: reporting status in year t) 
 
  After One Year 
 
After Two Years  After Three Years 
























00-01     -0.01 
(-0.38) 
     
01-02   -0.05 
(-3.46) 
     
00-02       -0.02 
(-1.39) 
  
Arabs   -0.12 
(-4.94) 
  -0.27 
(-6.96) 
  -0.23 
(-3.80) 
Orthodox Jews    0.11 
(8.63) 




Virtual Price B    0.07 
(3.05) 
  0.17 
(3.97) 
  0.21 
(2.46) 
Virtual Price C    0.12 
(4.82) 
  0.19 
(4.57)  




        



















































  4,876  4,876 2,557 2,557  798  798 
t statistics are in parentheses 
* The bottom quintile is omitted.   29
Table 5: Logit estimates of information effect on take-up rates 
(Dependent variable: reporting status in year t) 
 
  After One Year 
 
After Two Years 
 


























00-01     -0.03 
(0.14) 
    
01-02   -0.30 
(12.05) 
    
00-02       -0.11 
(1.89) 
  
Arabs   -1.34 
(28.66) 
  -1.62 
(43.28) 
  -1.15 
(14.09) 
Orthodox Jews    0.62 
(68.74) 




Virtual Price B    0.65 
(12.03) 
  0.90 
(16.93) 
  1.15 
(6.59) 
Virtual Price C    0.91 
(23.61) 
  1.00 
(21.53) 
  1.04 
(5.60) 
Apartment Size by 
Quintiles*: 
        



















































  4,876  4,876 2,557  2,557 798  798 
Wald Chi-Square statistics are in parentheses 
Bottom quintile is omitted. 
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Table 6: OLS estimates of information effect on take-up rates – non-Orthodox 
Jews only 
(Dependent variable: reporting status in year t) 
 
  After One Year 
 
After Two Years  After Three Years 


























00-01     -0.01 
(-0.48) 
    
01-02   -0.04  
(-2.31) 
    
00-02       -0.05   
(-2.01) 
  
Virtual Price B    0.13 
(3.72) 
  0.23 
(3.55) 
  0.30 
(2.49) 
Virtual Price C    0.15 
(4.42) 
  0.21 
(3.41) 




      






























 -0.12   
(-1.49) 



















  2,492 2,492 1,342 1,342  515  515 
    t statistics are in parentheses 
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Table 7: Take-up rates for different time distances for the same household 
 
Take-up rates  Time Length since 
eligibility date  4 that become 5 
(Control Group)
5 that become 6 
and reported on 
the fifth member 
(Treated Group) 
5 that become 6 
but did not report 






One  year  0.16  0.32  0.11  0.26 
Two years  0.37  0.56  0.26  0.47 






Table 8: OLS estimates of time exposure effect on take-up 
(Dependent variable: reporting status in year t) 
 




1 Year     -0.21 
(-15.35) 
   -0.20 
(-11.79) 
3 Years     0.08 
  (5.82) 
   0.08 
  (4.92) 
1 year*Treated      -0.04 
 (-1.36) 
3 years*Treated      -0.01 
 (-0.27) 
Price B    -0.01 
(-0.26) 
  -0.01 
(-0.22) 
Price C    0.04 
(0.74) 
  0.04 
(0.78) 
Number  of 
Observations 
798 798 
t statistic are in parentheses 
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Figure 2: The Level of Benefits by Twentiles

































































Appendix 1: Application Form 
 
“Hagihon” – Jerusalem Water Company  
 









I declare that residing in my apartment, located on __________ Street, number______ 
 
there are _____________________________ members. (Less than age 18) 
 
For children under age 18, please complete the following: 
 
Name__________________ I.D. ______________ 
 
Name__________________ I.D. ______________ 
 
Name__________________ I.D. ______________ 
 
Name__________________ I.D. ______________ 
 
Total number of persons residing in the apartment:_________________ 
 
 
Below is my signature. I confirm that all details are true, and will provide notification 
of any changes in these details. 
 




*Translated to English by the authors 
 
 CESifo Working Paper Series 




1768 Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda, Individual Attitudes towards Immigrants: 
Welfare-State Determinants across Countries, July 2006 
 
1769 Maarten Bosker and Harry Garretsen, Geography Rules Too! Economic Development 
and the Geography of Institutions, July 2006 
 
1770 M. Hashem Pesaran and Allan Timmermann, Testing Dependence among Serially 
Correlated Multi-category Variables, July 2006 
 
1771 Juergen von Hagen and Haiping Zhang, Financial Liberalization in a Small Open 
Economy, August 2006 
 
1772 Alessandro Cigno, Is there a Social Security Tax Wedge?, August 2006 
 
1773 Peter Egger, Simon Loretz, Michael Pfaffermayr and Hannes Winner, Corporate 
Taxation and Multinational Activity, August 2006 
 
1774 Jeremy S.S. Edwards, Wolfgang Eggert and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, The Measurement 
of Firm Ownership and its Effect on Managerial Pay, August 2006 
 
1775 Scott Alan Carson and Thomas N. Maloney, Living Standards in Black and White: 
Evidence from the Heights of Ohio Prison Inmates, 1829 – 1913, August 2006 
 
1776 Richard Schmidtke, Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities, 
August 2006 
 
1777 Ben J. Heijdra and Jenny E. Ligthart, The Transitional Dynamics of Fiscal Policy in 
Small Open Economies, August 2006 
 
1778 Jay Pil Choi, How Reasonable is the ‘Reasonable’ Royalty Rate? Damage Rules and 
Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights, August 2006 
 
1779 Ludger Woessmann, Efficiency and Equity of European Education and Training 
Policies, August 2006 
 
1780 Gregory Ponthiere, Growth, Longevity and Public Policy, August 2006 
 
1781 Laszlo Goerke, Corporate and Personal Income Tax Declarations, August 2006 
 
1782 Florian Englmaier, Pablo Guillén, Loreto Llorente, Sander Onderstal and Rupert 
Sausgruber, The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit 
Auctions, August 2006 
 
1783 Adam S. Posen and Daniel Popov Gould, Has EMU had any Impact on the Degree of 
Wage Restraint?, August 2006  
1784 Paolo M. Panteghini, A Simple Explanation for the Unfavorable Tax Treatment of 
Investment Costs, August 2006 
 
1785 Alan J. Auerbach, Why have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined? Another Look, August 
2006 
 
1786 Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita, Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the 
Holdup Problem, August 2006 
 
1787 Rafael Lalive and Alejandra Cattaneo, Social Interactions and Schooling Decisions, 
August 2006 
 
1788 George Kapetanios, M. Hashem Pesaran and Takashi Yamagata, Panels with 
Nonstationary Multifactor Error Structures, August 2006 
 
1789 Torben M. Andersen, Increasing Longevity and Social Security Reforms, August 2006 
 
1790 John Whalley, Recent Regional Agreements: Why so many, why so much Variance in 
Form, why Coming so fast, and where are they Headed?, August 2006 
 
1791 Sebastian G. Kessing and Kai A. Konrad, Time Consistency and Bureaucratic Budget 
Competition, August 2006 
 
1792 Bertil Holmlund, Qian Liu and Oskar Nordström Skans, Mind the Gap? Estimating the 
Effects of Postponing Higher Education, August 2006 
 
1793 Peter Birch Sørensen, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They?, August 
2006 
 
1794 Michael Kosfeld, Akira Okada and Arno Riedl, Institution Formation in Public Goods 
Games, September 2006 
 
1795 Marcel Gérard, Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, a 
Tentative Appraisal, September 2006 
 
1796 Louis Eeckhoudt, Béatrice Rey and Harris Schlesinger, A Good Sign for Multivariate 
Risk Taking, September 2006 
 
1797 Dominique M. Gross and Nicolas Schmitt, Why do Low- and High-Skill Workers 
Migrate? Flow Evidence from France, September 2006 
 
1798 Dan Bernhardt, Stefan Krasa and Mattias Polborn, Political Polarization and the 
Electoral Effects of Media Bias, September 2006 
 
1799 Pierre Pestieau and Motohiro Sato, Estate Taxation with Both Accidental and Planned 
Bequests, September 2006 
 
1800 Øystein Foros and Hans Jarle Kind, Do Slotting Allowances Harm Retail Competition?, 
September 2006 
  
1801 Tobias Lindhe and Jan Södersten, The Equity Trap, the Cost of Capital and the Firm’s 
Growth Path, September 2006 
 
1802 Wolfgang Buchholz, Richard Cornes and Wolfgang Peters, Existence, Uniqueness and 
Some Comparative Statics for Ratio- and Lindahl Equilibria: New Wine in Old Bottles, 
September 2006 
 
1803 Jan Schnellenbach, Lars P. Feld and Christoph Schaltegger, The Impact of Referendums 
on the Centralisation of Public Goods Provision: A Political Economy Approach, 
September 2006 
 
1804 David-Jan Jansen and Jakob de Haan, Does ECB Communication Help in Predicting its 
Interest Rate Decisions?, September 2006 
 
1805 Jerome L. Stein, United States Current Account Deficits: A Stochastic Optimal Control 
Analysis, September 2006 
 
1806 Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economies and Corruption all over the World: What do 
we really Know?, September 2006 
 
1807 Joerg Lingens and Klaus Waelde, Pareto-Improving Unemployment Policies, 
September 2006 
 
1808 Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm and James Raymond Vreeland, Does Membership on 
the UN Security Council Influence IMF Decisions? Evidence from Panel Data, 
September 2006 
 
1809 Prabir De, Regional Trade in Northeast Asia: Why do Trade Costs Matter?, September 
2006 
 
1810 Antonis Adam and Thomas Moutos, A Politico-Economic Analysis of Minimum Wages 
and Wage Subsidies, September 2006 
 
1811 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Christoph Hanck, Cointegration Tests of PPP: Do they 
also Exhibit Erratic Behaviour?, September 2006 
 
1812 Robert S. Chirinko and Hisham Foad, Noise vs. News in Equity Returns, September 
2006 
 
1813 Oliver Huelsewig, Eric Mayer and Timo Wollmershaeuser, Bank Behavior and the Cost 
Channel of Monetary Transmission, September 2006 
 
1814 Michael S. Michael, Are Migration Policies that Induce Skilled (Unskilled) Migration 
Beneficial (Harmful) for the Host Country?, September 2006 
 
1815 Eytan Sheshinski, Optimum Commodity Taxation in Pooling Equilibria, October 2006 
 
1816 Gottfried Haber and Reinhard Neck, Sustainability of Austrian Public Debt: A Political 
Economy Perspective, October 2006 
  
1817 Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, Ulrich Schreiber and Georg Wamser, The Impact of 
Thin-Capitalization Rules on Multinationals’ Financing and Investment Decisions, 
October 2006 
 
1818 Eric O’N. Fisher and Sharon L. May, Relativity in Trade Theory: Towards a Solution to 
the Mystery of Missing Trade, October 2006 
 
1819 Junichi Minagawa and Thorsten Upmann, Labor Supply and the Demand for Child 
Care: An Intertemporal Approach, October 2006 
 
1820 Jan K. Brueckner and Raquel Girvin, Airport Noise Regulation, Airline Service Quality, 
and Social Welfare, October 2006 
 
1821 Sijbren Cnossen, Alcohol Taxation and Regulation in the European Union, October 
2006 
 
1822 Frederick van der Ploeg, Sustainable Social Spending in a Greying Economy with 
Stagnant Public Services: Baumol’s Cost Disease Revisited, October 2006 
 
1823 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Cross-Border Mergers & 
Acquisitions: The Facts as a Guide for International Economics, October 2006 
 
1824 J. Atsu Amegashie, A Psychological Game with Interdependent Preference Types, 
October 2006 
 
1825 Kurt R. Brekke, Ingrid Koenigbauer and Odd Rune Straume, Reference Pricing of 
Pharmaceuticals, October 2006 
 
1826 Sean Holly, M. Hashem Pesaran and Takashi Yamagata, A Spatio-Temporal Model of 
House Prices in the US, October 2006 
 
1827 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Inequality and the US Import Demand 
Function, October 2006 
 
1828 Eytan Sheshinski, Longevity and Aggregate Savings, October 2006 
 
1829 Momi Dahan and Udi Nisan, Low Take-up Rates: The Role of Information, October 
2006 